According to a Kyodo News report, start of the reprocessing plant in Rokkasho will be delayed by at least two years by the plant operator, Japan Nuclear Fuel Ltd. AtomInfo.ru estimates that this is the 18th delay for Rokkasho. The plan was expected to begin operations in October 2010. One of the problems that caused the delay this time is related to performance of the induction oven used in waste vitrification.
According to a report in Albuquerque Journal (see the Global Security Network story), the Los Alamos National Laboratory has repackaged Russian-origin plutonium to address potential safety issues identified by the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board in April 2009. The procedure involved placing original 160 containers that contain plutonium into sturdier U.S.-designed containers.
The report did not mention that the material in question is Pu-238, a non-fissile isotope of plutonium used primarily in radioisotope thermal generators that power deep space missions (see the 2009 National Research Council report on the issue).
The United States is no longer producing the isotope. In 1992, Russia agreed to sell the United States about 30 kg of Pu-238 at the reported cost of $6 million. About 20 kg of this material is believed to have been delivered. Apparently, this is the material that was handled at Los Alamos. In 2009, Russia notified the United States that it could not deliver the remaining material. As a result, DoE initiated a program to reestablish domestic production of the isotope. The Advanced Test Reactor (ATR) at Idaho National Laboratory and the High Flux Isotope Reactor (HFIR) at Oak Ridge National Laboratory were identified as reactors that can take produce Pu-238.
Atomic Energy of Canada Limited's (AECL) reported that repair work on the NRU reactor at the Chalk River Laboratories has been completed and the reactor is now ready to resume production of medical isotopes. It was shut down in May 2009, when operators discovered a heavy water leak after an unscheduled stop.
The NRU reactor is one of the leading providers of medical isotopes in the world and therefore is a large consumer of highly-enriched uranium that is used in the process. Fissile material for the targets is supplied by the United States.
The United States and India signed an agreement that would allow India to reprocess U.S.-obligated nuclear fuel at its civilian reprocessing facilities. The document is part of the U.S.-India nuclear cooperation agreement and is formally known as the Arrangements and Procedures Pursuant to Article 6(iii) of the Agreement for Cooperation Concerning Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy.
The agreement allows for India to set at least two, possibly three, or 'more' new safeguarded reprocessing plants:
The Government of the United States of America and the Government of India understand the need for sufficient indigenous Indian capacity to reprocess or otherwise alter in form or content, under IAEA safeguards, U.S.-obligated nuclear material subject to the Agreement for Cooperation. Based on this understanding, the Parties agree to pursue the steps necessary, consistent with their national laws, to permit reprocessing or alteration in form or content of nuclear material subject to the Agreement for Cooperation at one or more new additional national facilities in India, (beyond the two facilities provided for in these Arrangements and Procedures) established by the Government of India and dedicated to the reprocessing and, as required, other alteration in form or content of safeguarded nuclear material under IAEA safeguards. These Arrangements and Procedures shall apply to such facilities upon successful completion of these steps, unless otherwise agreed by the Parties.
India currently has three reprocessing plants: Trombay at Mumbai (50 tonnes of heavy metal per year, commissioned in 1964), REFRE at Tarapur (100 MTHM, 1977), and KARP at Kalpakkam (100 MTHM, 1998).
According to IPFM information, Russia entered into two major HEU-supply arrangements in the 1990.
In April 1996, Russia concluded and agreement with France to supply it with HEU for three research reactors - one in Saclay site and for two reactors in Grenoble. Under the agreement, Minatom supplied 620 kg of HEU in three shipments completed by 2004. No arrangements for renewing the agreement have been made, although France reportedly expressed interest in acquiring more HEU from Russia (as well as from the United States). The Russian government has not yet decided on France's request.
Under the 1998 intergovernmental agreement with Germany, Russia supplied 300 kg of 93% enriched uranium. The agreement had an extension option that would increase the amount of uranium to 1200 kg. However, this option required an additional agreement. In 2003, five year before the expiration of the 1998 arrangement, Germany notified Russia that it will not try extending it.
On July 21, 2010 the China Experimental Fast Reactor (CEFR) achieved its first criticality. The reactor, operated by the China Institute of Atomic Energy (CIAE) in Beijing, is a 20 MWe (65 MWt) sodium-cooled pool type reactor. It is supposed to be the first in a series of fast reactors that China is planning to build by 2030.
According to AtomInfo.ru, the current plan calls for construction of a series of fast reactors similar to the Russian BN-800. The demonstration reactor, CDFR, is expected to start operating in 2018. A small series of commercial CCFR reactors, will be completed by 2030. China is also planning to build a demonstration large fast breeder reactor, CDFBR, that would provide 1000-1500 MWe by the and of 2020s and then a commercial series of reactors of this type, CCFBR, in the 2030s.
It is not clear if China will use Russia's assistance in building the first reactors of the BN-800 type. According to an intergovernmental agreement, Russia will build two BN-800 reactors in China.
The U.S. Department of Energy announced its intent to modify some components of its plutonium disposition program. A formal notice in the Federal Register outlines the proposed changes.
The goal of the U.S. Surplus Plutonium Disposition program is to dispose about 50 tonnes of plutonium that was declared excess to U.S. security needs. The U.S.-Russian Plutonium Management and Disposition Agreement, which was finalized in April 2010, requires each side to dispose of at least 34 tonnes of weapon-origin plutonium.
As the U.S. part of the plutonium disposition program was taking shape, DoE identified about 50 tonnes of plutonium to be disposed of. The key decision taken in 2002 called for a dual-track approach - about 17 tonnes of the material were to be immobilized and up to 33 tonnes were to be used as feedstock for MOX fuel to be used in existing civilian light-water reactors. As a result of this decision, the United States began construction of the MOX Fuel Fabrication Facility (MFFF) at Savannah River Site (the facility is built by Areva).
By 2007, DoE decided to use 4 of the 17 tonnes of material in its R&D program - that plutonium was used to manufacture research fuel for non-defense use (which remains unirradiated as of 2010). In 2007, DoE looked at three alternative ways to dispose of the remaining 13 tonnes of the surplus plutonium - glass can-in-canister, ceramic can-in-canister, and MOX fabrication (although less than a third of the material was considered to be suitable for MOX). No decision on a disposition route has been made and now DoE would like to consider other options.
Since 2002, the composition of the material to be disposed of has changed. In 2007, the United States declared 9 tonnes of weapon-origin plutonium (so-called "pit plutonium") as surplus to its defense needs. Two tonnes of that material were added to the 33 tonnes of Pu to be used in MOX. However, the total amount of MOX-designated Pu increased only by one tonne, reaching 34 tonnes. Seven tonnes of the new surplus pit plutonium were added to the material to be disposed of by other route. Of the 13 tonnes of Pu that were previously in this category, only 6 tonnes left - about 6.5 tonnes were moved to the MOX-designated pool (again, without increasing the total amount there; note, that in 2007 it was believed that less than about 4 tonnes can be used for MOX). About 0.6 tonnes will be reprocessed in the H-Canyon and then disposed of at the Defense Waste Processing Facility. As a result, DoE again has 13 tonnes of surplus material without a clear disposition route - 6 tonnes of "old" non-pit plutonium and 7 tonnes of pit plutonium added in 2007. The total amount of surplus plutonium is now about 52 tonnes (34+13+0.6+4 tonnes; additional 3 tonnes of scrap and waste plutonium, not included in these totals, were sent to the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant)
Now DoE is looking for a strategy that would allow it to efficiently combine all elements of its disposition program. Among the options that DoE will consider are immobilization in glass can-in-canister, fabrication of MOX fuel, processing some material in H-Canyon/DWPF, and sending some material to the WIPP facility as waste. Among the decisions that will have to be made is the one about future of the Plutonium Disassembly and Conversion Facility (PDCF), which was to disassemble weapons and convert metal plutonium to oxide form to be used as feedstock for MOX fabrication, and of the Plutonium Preparation (PuP) project, which was supposed to convert and package non-pit plutonium. In its FY2011 request, DoE assumed that the PDCF will absorb PuP activities. Now this option is being reconsidered.
Another component of the current round of changes is the intent to explore the possibility of using the MOX fuel produced by MFFF in reactors of the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA). Two TVA nuclear power stations have been identified as candidates for MOX - Sequoyah and Brown Ferry. It should be noted that TVA is taking part in a number of DoE programs already - the TVA HEU Down-blending Project and the Tritium Readiness program. Earlier, DoE had a contract with Duke Energy to use MOX fuel in its reactors, but this contract was terminated in 2008, probably after problems with tests of fuel assemblies.
IPFM's draft of "A Treaty Banning the Production of Fissile Materials for Nuclear Weapons or Other Nuclear Explosive Devices", with article-by-article explanations is now available as an official document of the United Nations Conference on Disarmament (CD). The CD has been charged with negotiating this Treaty.
The draft Treaty was jointly submitted to the CD by Japan, Canada and the Netherlands in September 2009. The three delegations noted that while the draft treaty does not represent the official positions of these states, it "is intended to provide the Member States of the Conference on Disarmament with useful resource material for our work in the prospective negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty."
The draft Treaty is now available in all official UN languages:
- Arabic: عاهدة (وقف) إنتاج المواد الانشطارية,
- Chinese: (禁产)裂变材料条约,
- English: A Fissile Material (Cut-Off) Treaty,
- French: Traité sur les matières fissiles (arrêt de la production) (TMF(A)),
- Russian: Договор относительно (прекращения производства) расщепляющегося материала,
- Spanish Tratado (de cesación de la producción) de materiales fisibles.
URENCO began operations of its URENCO USA uranium enrichment facility (formerly known as National Enrichment Facility, NEF), built in Eunice, New Mexico. The plant is owned by LES, which is a wholly owned subsidiary of URENCO Ltd.
The facility is expected to reach capacity of 5.7 million SWU/year. Construction of the facility is part of the URENCO plan to reach the U.S. market and to expand its enrichment capacity.
Russia and Kazakhstan reportedly reached an agreement that would put on hold the plans to expand the uranium enrichment capacity at Angarsk. The expansion was part of the development strategy of the Russia-Kazakhstan joint venture, which was supposed to supply enriched uranium to the world market. (This joint venture is different from the International Uranium Enrichment Center in Angarsk, in which both countries are active participants.) The press reports quote a Russian official as saying that Russia offered Kazakhstan an up to 49 percent stake in one of its enrichment plants - Urals Electrochemical Combine or the Electrochemical Plant in Zelenogorsk.
UPDATE 07/08/10: AtomInfo.ru report suggests that Kazatomprom may receive up to 30% stake in the Urals Electrochemical Combine in Novouralsk.
