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The Japanese government reported that at the end of 2009 its total stock of plutonium was 31.0 tonnes. Of this material, 6.9 tonnes are reported to be in Japan and 24.1 tonnes - abroad (in France and U.K.). The report says that the Rokkasho plant did not produce any plutonium in 2009:

Japan Nuclear Fuel Ltd.'s reprocessing plant in Aomori Prefecture extracted no plutonium due to a series of problems.

This is the fourth in a series of four posts on the openness of the French "closed" fuel cycle

Several members of the French High Committee for transparency and information on nuclear safety (HCTISN) declined to endorse the report it published on 12 July 2010 on the transparency of the management of the French nuclear fuel cycle (see Part 3 of  this series). In an explanatory note, the representatives of various environmental NGOs (Greenpeace, ACRO, France Nature Environnement), backed by another member, representative of the Network of Local Commissions for Information near nuclear sites (ANCLI) "emphasize that the discussions did not enable a complete and representative picture to be reached at this stage" and "call for the group's work to be continued". (1)

Complaining that the deadlines set for the official publication of the report did not allow for the group to discuss some of the questions raised, they could only introduce a short statement of reservations after the report's executive summary. These reservations are exposed in detail in an explanatory note (in French).

The note insists that it is the focus of the working group's referral on uranium trade with Russia, poor methodology and the unrealistically tight schedule that explain the shortcomings, and expresses confidence in the capacity of the HCTISN to "bring the work to its conclusion". Nevertheless, the members point to a number of major failures in what they call "an incomplete and unfinished work".

This is the third in a series of four posts on the openness of the French "closed" fuel cycle

French industry and government assertions about the "closed" character of the nuclear fuel "cycle" are misrepresentating the facts. This is the main finding of the High Committee for transparency and information on nuclear safety (Haut comité pour la transparence et l'information sur la sécurité nucléaire - HCTISN), which on 12 July 2010 published its conclusions on "the transparency of the fuel cycle management".

The independent Committee was created by the 2006 Act on Nuclear Transparency, comprises operators, state authorities, trade-unions and environmental NGOs and advises Government and Parliament on nuclear issues. The report had been commissioned by the Minister of Environment and the Parliamentary Office for the Evaluation of Scientific and Technological Options (Office parlementaire d'évaluation des choix scientifiques et technologiques - OPECST) and was triggered by a controversy in October 2009 about French uranium exports to Russia. A TV documentary had shown that reprocessed uranium was sent to Russia for storage with little realistic perspective to be used, contradicting official assertions about the recycling of uranium and its benefits. The end of this uranium waste trade, confirmed by AREVA in May 2010, was reported by Greenpeace as effective as of 11 July 2010. Incidentally, the HCTISN report was presented to the Minister of environment the very next day.

This is the second in a series of four posts on the openness of the French "closed" fuel cycle

Official plans to manage French uranium and plutonium stockpiles over the long term were dealt a new blow when a scientific committee expressed doubts on conclusions drawn from unsupported scenarios. The report by the National committee for the assessment of research and studies on the management of radioactive materials and wastes (Commission nationale d'évaluation des recherches et études relatives à la gestion des matières et des déchets radioactifs - CNE), published on 16 June 2010, comes shortly after the revised edition of the National management scheme for radioactive materials and wastes, PNGMDR, stressed the need for considering the possibility that long term plans to re-use accumulated nuclear materials fail.

This is the first in a series of four posts on the openness of the French "closed" fuel cycle

On 4 June 2010, the French government published the new National Radioactive Materials and Wastes Management Scheme (Plan national de gestion des matières et des déchets radioactifs - PNGMDR). This report, drafted by the state authorities and formally discussed with stakeholders, is revised every three years and presents the current national strategy for radioactive waste management, under the 2006 Act for the sustainable management of radioactive materials and wastes (loi n° 2006-739 du 28 juin 2006 de programme relative à la gestion durable des matières et des déchets radioactifs).

The general aim of the report is to discuss the implementation status of management options for the various categories of nuclear materials and wastes, as well as existing and foreseen storage and disposal capacities. One important issue is the separation between "waste" and "material" inventories. This distinction was introduced by a specific feature of the 2006 Act, which stipulates that, contrary to the general rule whereby any by-product of industrial production is to be considered waste unless it would be effectively re-used, a radioactive by-product is to be considered waste only if there is no foreseen plan to possibly re-use it.

In practice, this rule provides an exemption for any by-products containing uranium or plutonium be dealt with as waste. The operators simply need to declare that they intend to re-use by-products as part of a "reprocessing-recycling" scheme, no matter whether this could take place in the short-term and existing facilities or in hypothetical long-term scenarios. This applies to natural, enriched or depleted uranium, spent fuel, reprocessed uranium or separated plutonium, all stored in large quantities with a "re-usable material" label.

This laxity is key to maintain the industry and authorities' claim that the "reprocessing-recycling" option would be reducing the volume of final waste to be dealt with, compared to the direct disposal of spent fuel. But this would only work if the massive stocks of "re-usable materials" were effectively to be re-used in a foreseeable future, the likeliness of which is not and has never been demonstrated.

France submitted to IAEA a declaration of its civilian plutonium and HEU holdings as of December 31, 2009 - INFCIRC/549/Add.5/14. According to the document, at the end of 2009 France had 47.1 tonnes of unirradiated separated plutonium stored at reprocessing plants, 6.8 tonnes held up in the fuel fabrication process, 27.2 tonnes in unirradiated MOX fuel, and 0.7 tonnes described as "held elsewhere" - it is the material that is held up in the reprocessing plant and located at research facilities. Of the total of 81.8 tonnes, 24.9 tonnes is foreign material. Less than 50 kg of French plutonium is held outside of the country. No material was in transit. At the end of 2008, France declared 83.8 tonnes of separated plutonium.

The Japanese Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA) disclosed details of an accident that happened on August 26, 2010 at the Monju fast breeder reactor (here is the original JAEA letter). As described in the press, the accident involved a 3-tonne "fuel-replacement device" falling into the reactor vessel when being removed after a scheduled fuel replacement operation. According to JAEA, the accident may result in a delay in bringing the reactor back into operation, since the device may have damaged the reactor vessel wall.

According to a Kyodo News report, start of the reprocessing plant in Rokkasho will be delayed by at least two years by the plant operator, Japan Nuclear Fuel Ltd. AtomInfo.ru estimates that this is the 18th delay for Rokkasho. The plan was expected to begin operations in October 2010. One of the problems that caused the delay this time is related to performance of the induction oven used in waste vitrification.

Rosatom officially designated the Mining and Chemical Combine at Zheleznogorsk as the site for the future MOX fuel production facility, which will manufacture fuel for BN-800 reactor. This process may involve weapon-grade plutonium that Russia committed for disposition as part of the U.S.-Russian Plutonium Management and Disposition Agreement. It also appears that the U.S. funds can be used to finance construction of the facility.

According to a Financial Times report, Sergei Kiriyenko, head of Rosatom, confirmed that his corporation is in talks about building an enrichment facility in the United States. These talks were reported earlier - in 2008 and in 2009. The 2008 reports suggested that the facility may have a capacity of 3 million SWU/year.