IPFM International Panel on Fissile Materials

The IPFM BLOG: Tracking highly enriched uranium and plutonium, the key ingredients in nuclear weapons, and fostering global efforts to secure and eliminate these materials

This blog by members of the International Panel on Fissile Materials (IPFM), including co-chair Frank von Hippel of Princeton University, aims to provide the public, the media and policy makers information, technical analysis, and ideas to further nuclear disarmament, halt the proliferation of nuclear weapons, and ensure that terrorists do not acquire nuclear weapons.

The views expressed in this blog are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent positions of the IPFM.

breifings, briefings, conference on disarmament, consolidation, disarmament, europe, fissile materials, fmct, france, gfmr, heu, india, mox, nonproliferation, nuclear disarmament, nuclear weapons, plutonium, presentation, presentations, reprocessing, russia, stocks, treaties, united kingdom, us-india nuclear deal, washington

IPFM Goes to Washington

posted by Alexander Glaser on Dec 14th, 2009 [22:49h]
under: Washington, presentation, breifings
last edited on Dec 15th, 2009 [09:55h]

On Thursday, 10 December, the International Panel on Fissile Materials (IPFM) presented Global Fissile Material Report 2009: A Path to Nuclear Disarmament in Washington, DC to Congressional staff, government officials, and nuclear arms control and disarmament groups at an event sponsored by the AAAS Center for Science, Technology and Security Policy and another organized jointly by the Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation and Non-Proliferation and the Elliott School of International Affairs at George Washington University.

(photo: Jimmy Stewart in "Mr. Smith Goes to Washington," courtesy Columbia Pictures, 1939)

To help inform the Washington policy making process, IPFM members James Acton, Alexander Glaser, Zia Mian and Frank von Hippel presented some of the key technical and policy issues and IPFM recommendations for practical steps toward verified world-wide nuclear disarmament developed in Global Fissile Material Report 2009. The presentation (available here) covered the context of the new disarmament debate, the status of fissile material stockpiles and their implication for a disarming world, how declarations of fissile material stocks could be verified using nuclear archaeology, the verifiable dismantlement of nuclear weapons and the disposition of the roughly 2000 tons of fissile material existing today (both plutonium and highly enriched uranium) that could be used for weapons.

IPFM presents "A Path to Nuclear Disarmament" at the United Nations

posted by Alexander Glaser on Oct 29th, 2009 [15:14h]
under: disarmament, gfmr
last edited on Oct 29th, 2009 [16:08h]

On Wednesday, 28 October, the International Panel on Fissile Materials (IPFM), presented Global Fissile Material Report 2009: A Path to Nuclear Disarmament at the United Nations General Assembly’s First Committee, which is responsible for international peace and security.

Global Fissile Material Report 2009 charts some of the key technical and policy steps for securing verifiable world-wide nuclear disarmament and eliminating the world’s huge stockpiles of highly enriched uranium and plutonium, the key materials for making nuclear weapons.

Nuclear disarmament has returned to the center of international debate following President Barack Obama’s April 2009 speech in Prague, in which he pledged “to seek the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons.” In September 2009, the United Nations Security Council, which includes the five major nuclear weapon states, unanimously agreed “to create the conditions for a world without nuclear weapons.”

Global Fissile Material Report 2009 discusses how nuclear-armed states could declare their stockpiles of nuclear weapons, plutonium and highly enriched uranium, and how these declarations might be verified using the methods and tools being developed for what is now called ‘nuclear archaeology.’

The report includes IPFM’s annual assessment of worldwide stocks, production, and disposition of highly enriched uranium and plutonium, and current efforts to eliminate these materials. There are nine nuclear-armed states and over 20,000 nuclear weapons today. The report includes for the first time an estimate of the number and locations of nuclear weapons sites worldwide, listed by country.

The IPFM estimates that the current global stockpile of highly enriched uranium is about 1600 metric tons. There are about 500 tons of separated plutonium, divided almost equally between weapon and civilian stocks, but it is all weapon-usable. The global stockpiles of plutonium and highly enriched uranium together are sufficient for over one hundred thousand nuclear weapons. The report lists the location, size and safeguards status of operating, under construction and planned fissile material production facilities around the world.

The report considers options for monitoring nuclear warhead dismantlement and the disposition of the fissile materials they contain as well as other stockpiles of fissile materials; verifiably ending the production of fissile materials for weapons, through a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (a topic treated in detail in Global Fissile Material Report 2008); the potential roles of nuclear fuel-cycle facilities in enabling nuclear breakout in a disarmed world; and the potential contributions of societal or citizen verification to making it impossible to conceal illicit nuclear-weapon-related activities.

Japan, Canada and Netherlands submit IPFM draft of FM(C)T to United Nations Conference on Disarmament

posted by Alexander Glaser on Sep 18th, 2009 [08:11h]
under: Fissile Materials, Treaties, Conference on Disarmament
last edited on Sep 18th, 2009 [09:38h]

Japan’s Ambassador Suda announced at the United Nations Conference on Disarmament (CD) that his delegation, along with those of Canada and the Netherlands, jointly submitted to the CD the draft FM(C)T prepared by the International Panel on Fissile Materials, entitled A Treaty Banning the Production of Fissile Materials for Nuclear Weapons or Other Nuclear Explosive Devices, with article-by-article explanations. He explained that the document is intended to provide CD members with “useful reference materials in the prospective negotiations of a fissile materials cut-off treaty.”

Unofficial transcript
Japan, Ambassador Akio Suda
17 September 2009
Thank you, Mr. President.

I asked for the floor briefly to draw the members’ attention to the Document prepared by the International Panel on Fissile Materials; entitled "A Treaty Banning the Production of Fissile Materials for Nuclear Weapons or Other Nuclear Explosive Devices, with article-by-article explanations", dated 2nd September 2009 - which the Delegations of Canada, Japan and the Netherlands jointly submitted yesterday to the CD secretariat for its circulation as an official document of the CD.

The purpose of circulating this document is to provide the Member States of the Conference with useful reference materials in the prospective negotiations of a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty. I would like to highlight that the document submitted does not in any way represent the official positions of the States submitting it. Although having been told that this submission cannot be reflected in the draft report in front of us due to the time constraint, I hope that it will be reflected in the list of documents submitted to the Conference and recorded under Paragraph 37 of the Final Report of the Conference.

Thank you, Mr. President.

IPFM presentation

posted by Alexander Glaser on Sep 1st, 2009 [08:08h]
under: presentations, fissile materials, Europe
last edited on Sep 9th, 2009 [12:15h]

IPFM presentation on Scope and Verification of a Fissile Material (Cutoff) Treaty at the United Nations Conference on Disarmament, Geneva

Friday, 21 August 2009

To help inform discussions at the United Nations Conference on Disarmament (CD), IPFM members Arend Meerburg, Zia Mian and Frank von Hippel made a presentation on the Scope and Verification of a Fissile Material (Cutoff) Treaty. The presentation was sponsored by the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR), the Swiss Department of Foreign Affairs, and the Delegation of Japan to the Conference on Disarmament.

The full text of the IPFM Fissile Material (Cutoff) Treaty, including an article-by-article discussion, is available here.

(c) Yann Forget, 2005

The CD, based in Geneva, has so far not been able to begin implementing the plan of work agreed in May 2009, which included negotiations on a treaty to ban production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons. Reports ON the CD meetings are available here.

Consolidating Fissile Materials in Russia's Nuclear Complex

posted by Zia Mian on May 27th, 2009 [17:50h]
under: Consolidation, Russia
last edited on May 27th, 2009 [17:56h]

A new IPFM research report, Consolidating Fissile Materials in Russia's Nuclear Complex, by Pavel Podvig, is now online. The report concludes that Russia could take major steps to further consolidate its very large stocks of weapon-usable fissile materials in a small number of safer, relatively secure storage sites

Russia has the world's largest stocks of weapon-usable fissile materials. These stocks are mostly a legacy of the Cold War, during which the Soviet Union and the United States each created nuclear industries sized to produce tens of thousands of nuclear weapons.

The fissile materials are in the custody of Rosatom, which is responsible for producing and disposing of Russia's nuclear weapons and building and fueling its reactors. The materials are scattered across numerous sites and facilities, some of which do not have adequate security or material accounting systems. Although Russia acknowledges the dangers associated with the continuing existence of these materials, the task of reducing the dangers by either eliminating the material or consolidating it in a small number of safer, more secure storage sites, has not received adequate priority.

This report describes Russia's nuclear complex in detail and suggests measures that would help Russia consolidate its fissile materials at a smaller number of sites, reduce transfers between sites, and clean out lower-security civilian sites.

Pavel Podvig, currently with Stanford University's Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC), was previously with the Center for Arms Control Studies at the Moscow Institute of Physics and Technology (MIPT) and Princeton University's Program on Science and Global Security.

IPFM Releases Draft International Treaty to Ban Production of Fissile Materials For Use in Nuclear Weapons: Fissile Material (Cutoff) Treaty

posted by Alexander Glaser on Feb 13th, 2009 [09:06h]
under: fmct
last edited on Feb 13th, 2009 [12:17h]

The International Panel on Fissile Materials (IPFM) has released for discussion a draft Fissile Material (Cutoff) Treaty, or FM(C)T. The text of the draft Treaty (available here) is accompanied by a detailed article by article explanation of the basic obligations, verification, implementation and organizational issues associated with the treaty.

Fissile Materials. A neutron is absorbed by the nucleus of a fissile atom (uranium-235 in this example), which splits into two fission products (barium and krypton in this example). The fission of one kilogram of uranium-235 or plutonium releases an energy equivalent to 18,000 tons of high explosive (TNT).

The FM(C)T would ban the production for use in nuclear weapons of fissile materials, the materials that undergo the nuclear fission chain reaction. It has long been seen as essential for strengthening the nonproliferation regime, reducing the risk of nuclear terrorism, and to achieving nuclear disarmament (read more).

In December 1993, the U.N. General Assembly adopted a resolution calling for the negotiation of "nondiscriminatory, multilateral, and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices." At the Review Conference of the Parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 2000, it was agreed that negotiations should commence immediately in the multilateral Conference on Disarmament (CD) in Geneva, "taking into consideration both nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation objectives... with a view to their conclusion within five years." Notwithstanding, the CD has, for various reasons, not formally launched negotiations on a treaty.

The IPFM draft Treaty aims to meet the conditions laid out by the UN General Assembly and agreed to by the Conference on Disarmament. It seeks to meet both nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation objectives by proposing to put under international safeguards pre-existing stocks of fissile materials that are for civilian use, in excess weapons and assigned to naval fuel.

The Panel hopes that this draft may assist future negotiations of this long overdue Treaty.

The IPFM draft FM(C)T was released on January 29, 2009, during an event organized by the Middle Powers Initiative at Rathaus Schöneberg in Berlin. Photo: (c) Axel Mauruszat, 2006

On January 29, 2009, Frank von Hippel, IPFM co-chair, presented elements of the draft for discussion at the Berlin meeting of the Article VI Forum, organized by the Middle Powers Initiative. The presentation, which is available here, focused on questions of the scope & verification of a Fissile Material (Cutoff) Treaty.

Future presentations of the draft treaty are planned for the NPT Prepcom in New York in May 2009.

For more details of the verification of a FM(C)T see Global Fissile Material Report 2008.

Release of Global Fissile Material Report 2008

posted by Alexander Glaser on Oct 11th, 2008 [09:36h]
under: briefings, gfmr, fmct
last edited on Oct 11th, 2008 [10:26h]

On Friday, 10 October, the International Panel on Fissile Materials (IPFM) released its 2008 Global Fissile Material Report and a Companion Volume at the United Nations. The report was presented to the UN General Assembly’s First Committee, which is reponsible for international peace and security.

The Global Fissile Material Report provides an annual review of worldwide stocks, production, and disposition of highly enriched uranium (HEU) and plutonium, the key ingredients in nuclear weapons, and assesses global efforts to secure and eliminate these materials. The control of these materials is crucial to nuclear disarmament, to halting the proliferation of nuclear weapons, and to ensuring that terrorists do not acquire nuclear weapons.

The special focus of the 2008 Global Fissile Material Report is the challenges of achieving a verifiable Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty, a long sought after global ban on the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons. A treaty banning the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons is an essential requirement for constraining nuclear arms races and, in the longer term, achieving nuclear disarmament. The production of these materials is the most difficult step in making nuclear weapons.

In 1993, the UN General Assembly called for the negotiation of a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty. These negotiations have not yet begun. There have been major disputes among states over the scope of a possible treaty and whether it can be verified. In 2006, the Bush Administration proposed a draft treaty that marked a break with previous U.S. policy, by omitting any provisions for international verification.

In the 2008 Global Fissile Material Report, the International Panel on Fissile Materials has proposed key elements for a verifiable treaty. In addition to a ban on all future production of fissile material for weapons, the Report makes a case that the treaty should also address pre-existing stocks of fissile material held by nuclear weapons states. In particular, the proposed treaty would ban the use for weapons of fissile material that was once in weapons and has been declared as excess because of reductions in nuclear arsenals, materials that have been declared for use in naval-propulsion or other military reactors, and all fissile materials that are in the civilian sector at the time a state joins the treaty.

Conference Room 4, before the event. The slides of the briefing are available here.

The Report also provides technical arguments for how a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty could be verified by the International Atomic Energy Agency. The report has chapters discussing verification at production facilities, namely uranium enrichment and plutonium separation (reprocessing) facilities; accounting of weapons materials declared excess for military use but still in classified form and highly enriched uranium reserved for naval reactor fuel; inspections at military nuclear sites to ensure they are not concealing covert production facilities; and, the monitoring of shutdown facilities that formerly produced fissile materials for nuclear weapons. The panel concludes, contrary to current US policy, that the treaty could be effectively verified at reasonable cost.

The 2008 Global Fissile Material Report has a Companion Volume: Banning the Production of Fissile Materials for Nuclear Weapons: Country Perspectives on the Challenges to a Fissile Material (Cutoff) Treaty. This volume provides a country-by-country analysis of the concerns of key states to different aspects of a prospective Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty. The report covers 11 countries: China, France, Germany, India, Israel, Japan, Pakistan, Russia, South Africa, United Kingdom and the United States, i.e., all the weapon states other than North Korea and three key non-weapon states. It proposes specific policy initiatives and compromises that states could make to break the logjam preventing negotiation on a treaty.

The Legacy of Reprocessing in the United Kingdom

posted by Alexander Glaser on Jul 8th, 2008 [15:25h]
under: plutonium, reprocessing, mox, united kingdom
last edited on Jul 8th, 2008 [16:08h]

After five decades, reprocessing at the United Kingdom’s Sellafield site in West Cumbria is winding down and, according to a new report for the International Panel on Fissile Materials (IPFM), it has left a costly legacy.

When current reprocessing contracts are fulfilled, Sellafield operations will have resulted in an accumulated UK stock of about 100 tonnes of separated plutonium – enough to make more than 10,000 nuclear weapons – plus almost 2 million cubic meters of radioactive waste. The plutonium is considered to be an asset of "zero value." The estimated direct cost of cleanup at the Sellafield site has risen to 73 billion British pounds ($146 billion). The final reckoning will be known only a half century hence when the cleanup is to be completed. Since the government-owned operator of the site, British Nuclear Fuels Limited, was found to be technically bankrupt, responsibility for operations there have been taken over by a government-established Nuclear Decommissioning Authority.

Magnox Fuel Storage Pond (Source: BNFL)

The report, commissioned by IPFM and authored by Martin Forwood, the Director of the UK non-governmental group CORE, concludes that this legacy is a result of UK reprocessing policy being driven by the short-term interests of the industry and by hopes that this industry could earn the UK foreign exchange through sales of reprocessing and MOX-fuel fabrication services to other countries. None of the UK’s foreign reprocessing customers have renewed their contracts, however. Most have concluded that it is much less costly to store their spent fuel at home than to send it abroad to be reprocessed and deal with the separated plutonium and returning highly radioactive waste.

Plans to either irradiate all or part of the legacy of separated plutonium in reactor fuel or dispose of it with radioactive waste currently await a decision largely dependent on whether the UK will build a new generation of nuclear power plants. A study done for the UK government found, however, that the throughput of the billion-dollar plant that was built at Sellafield for processing separated plutonium into mixed-oxide (MOX) will rise to “only a few tonnes of plutonium a year at best” because of design flaws.

The full report is available here -- For a hard copy, contact ipfm@fissilematerials.org

New Report: Spent Nuclear Fuel Reprocessing in France

posted by Mycle Schneider and Yves Marignac on May 21st, 2008 [16:53h]
under: plutonium, reprocessing, mox, france
last edited on May 21st, 2008 [17:02h]

IPFM has just released a new research report, "Spent Nuclear Fuel Reprocessing in France," by Mycle Schneider and Yves Marignac. The full report is available here -- For a hard copy, send mailing address to ipfm@fissilematerials.org

FROM THE REPORT:

France started to reprocess spent nuclear fuel in 1958, originally to produce plutonium for weapons and later also to fuel a projected but never realized large-scale deployment of fast breeder reactors. This report looks at the reprocessing experience at France’s Marcoule and La Hague sites and assesses the record in terms of waste management, radioactive discharges, radiological and health impacts, and cost, and addresses briefly issues of safety and security.

France now has large stocks of both spent fuel (over 12,000 tons) and of separated plutonium (over 50 tons). Analysis suggests there is no clear advantage for the reprocessing option as a form of waste management, either in terms of radioactive waste volumes or repository area.

La Hague is currently the largest man-made source of radioactivity releases. The radiological impact corresponds to collective doses following a significant nuclear accident, comparable to the 1957 waste explosion in Kyshtym in Russia or the Windscale (UK) fire. Continuing discharges at this level for the expected remaining years of its operation could cause 3000 additional cancer deaths or more over the long term.

Reprocessing in France also raises safety and security concerns. For instance, an average of about two truck shipments per week of separated plutonium from La Hague travel about 1,000 km to enable production of plutonium-bearing power-reactor fuel (MOX).

The economic costs of reprocessing are high. In 2000, a report for the French Prime Minister found that choosing reprocessing instead of direct disposal of spent nuclear fuel would result in a 5.5 percent increase in average electricity generation cost or an 85 percent increase of total spent fuel and waste management costs. Industry data suggests the costs of a future reprocessing plant would need to be at most half that for La Hague in order for reprocessing to cost no more than direct disposal of spent fuel.

Until recently, foreign reprocessing contracts have offset some of La Hague’s high costs. Until around 2004, close to half of the spent-fuel processed was foreign-owned. Almost all of the foreign spent fuel under contract has been reprocessed, and only minor new contracts have been signed. The economic burden of reprocessing is increasingly weighing on the French electricity sector and may prove unsustainable if left to market forces. Earlier this year, after several years of negotiations, the state electricity utility EDF and the state nuclear fuel company AREVA NC failed to reach a long-term agreement over the utility's plutonium separation and use.

India's Seach for African Uranium May Conflict with African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty

posted by Zia Mian on Mar 24th, 2008 [11:36h]
under: India, US-India Nuclear Deal
last edited on Mar 27th, 2008 [19:01h]

During a visit to Namibia, India's Minister of State for Commerce is reported to have asked for uranium supply ("India seeks uranium from Namibia for enhancing nuke energy," thehindu.com, 27 March 2008). This echoes news that India may be seeking uranium from various countries in Africa that are not members of the 45-nation Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) as a way to avoid the conditions for uranium sales that have been imposed by the NSG (Ramesh Ramachandran, "India to tap uranium-rich Africa for fuel," news.123india.com, 5 February 2008). The potential African uranium suppliers that are mentioned include Gabon, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Uganda and Angola - some of which are major uranium exporters.

India is desperate to increase its access to uranium because domestic sources are increasingly insufficient to support its civil and military nuclear programs. India is not able to import uranium from the Nuclear Suppliers Group of countries because it is outside the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT). The US is seeking a special exemption for India from this NSG condition of supply but progress has been slow. There is domestic opposition within India to the deal because of fears that the US may use it to influence Indian foreign policy. Others worry that access to imported uranium for its civilian power reactors would allow India to divert more domestic uranium to its nuclear weapons program.

India has also been unable so far to agree with the IAEA a set of appropriate safeguards on the parts of its nuclear program that it has declared to be civilian. The NSG has also yet to formally consider a possible exemption for India from NSG rules.

Even if the NSG grants an exemption, some NSG uranium suppliers may not export to India. Australia's new Labour Party government has announced it will not sell uranium to India unless it signs the NPT (K. Venugopal, "Australia will not supply uranium till India signs NPT," The Hindu, 2 March 2008). Thus India's turn to uranium suppliers outside the NSG.

However, India may not be able to import uranium from any of the African countries that are not in the NSG.

All the potential African uranium suppliers that have been mentioned in news reports are signatories of the 1996 African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty, the Treaty of Pelindaba. Under Article 9.C (VERIFICATION OF PEACEFUL USES) of this Treaty, each Party undertakes "Not to provide source or special fissionable material, or equipment or material especially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special fissionable material for peaceful purposes of any non-nuclear-weapon State unless subject to a comprehensive safeguards agreement concluded with IAEA."

Article II. (DEFINITIONS) refers to "source material ... as defined in Article XX of the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and as amended from time to time by the IAEA."

Article XX of the IAEA Statute says -- source material includes "uranium containing the mixture of isotopes occurring in nature"

India is not recognized as a nuclear weapon state under the NPT and therefore according to the Pelindaba Treaty must accept comprehensive or full-scope safeguards on ALL its nuclear source or special fissionable materials and associated facilities to be eligible for the purchase of uranium.

The Treaty of Pelindaba has not yet entered into force. Its entry into force requires 28 ratifications, and on March 26, 2008 Mozambique became the 24th state to ratify it. ("Mozambique: Assembly Ratifies Nuclear Weapon Free Zone", allafrica.com, 26 March 2008).

However, under Article 18 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties "A State is obliged to refrain from acts which would defeat the object and purpose of a treaty when: (a) it has signed the treaty ... until it shall have made its intention clear not to become a party to the treaty".

This would appear to imply that no signatory of the Treaty of Pelindaba is allowed to sell uranium to India until India is subject to a comprehensive safeguards agreement with the IAEA. In short, India would have to give up its nuclear weapons program if it wishes to buy uranium from Pelindaba state parties.

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