IPFM International Panel on Fissile Materials

breifings, briefings, conference on disarmament, consolidation, disarmament, europe, fissile materials, fmct, france, gfmr, heu, india, mox, nonproliferation, nuclear disarmament, nuclear weapons, plutonium, presentation, presentations, reprocessing, russia, stocks, treaties, united kingdom, us-india nuclear deal, washington

India's Seach for African Uranium May Conflict with African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty

posted by Zia Mian on Mar 24th, 2008 [11:36h]
under: India, US-India Nuclear Deal
last edited on Mar 27th, 2008 [19:01h]

During a visit to Namibia, India's Minister of State for Commerce is reported to have asked for uranium supply ("India seeks uranium from Namibia for enhancing nuke energy," thehindu.com, 27 March 2008). This echoes news that India may be seeking uranium from various countries in Africa that are not members of the 45-nation Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) as a way to avoid the conditions for uranium sales that have been imposed by the NSG (Ramesh Ramachandran, "India to tap uranium-rich Africa for fuel," news.123india.com, 5 February 2008). The potential African uranium suppliers that are mentioned include Gabon, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Uganda and Angola - some of which are major uranium exporters.

India is desperate to increase its access to uranium because domestic sources are increasingly insufficient to support its civil and military nuclear programs. India is not able to import uranium from the Nuclear Suppliers Group of countries because it is outside the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT). The US is seeking a special exemption for India from this NSG condition of supply but progress has been slow. There is domestic opposition within India to the deal because of fears that the US may use it to influence Indian foreign policy. Others worry that access to imported uranium for its civilian power reactors would allow India to divert more domestic uranium to its nuclear weapons program.

India has also been unable so far to agree with the IAEA a set of appropriate safeguards on the parts of its nuclear program that it has declared to be civilian. The NSG has also yet to formally consider a possible exemption for India from NSG rules.

Even if the NSG grants an exemption, some NSG uranium suppliers may not export to India. Australia's new Labour Party government has announced it will not sell uranium to India unless it signs the NPT (K. Venugopal, "Australia will not supply uranium till India signs NPT," The Hindu, 2 March 2008). Thus India's turn to uranium suppliers outside the NSG.

However, India may not be able to import uranium from any of the African countries that are not in the NSG.

All the potential African uranium suppliers that have been mentioned in news reports are signatories of the 1996 African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty, the Treaty of Pelindaba. Under Article 9.C (VERIFICATION OF PEACEFUL USES) of this Treaty, each Party undertakes "Not to provide source or special fissionable material, or equipment or material especially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special fissionable material for peaceful purposes of any non-nuclear-weapon State unless subject to a comprehensive safeguards agreement concluded with IAEA."

Article II. (DEFINITIONS) refers to "source material ... as defined in Article XX of the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and as amended from time to time by the IAEA."

Article XX of the IAEA Statute says -- source material includes "uranium containing the mixture of isotopes occurring in nature"

India is not recognized as a nuclear weapon state under the NPT and therefore according to the Pelindaba Treaty must accept comprehensive or full-scope safeguards on ALL its nuclear source or special fissionable materials and associated facilities to be eligible for the purchase of uranium.

The Treaty of Pelindaba has not yet entered into force. Its entry into force requires 28 ratifications, and on March 26, 2008 Mozambique became the 24th state to ratify it. ("Mozambique: Assembly Ratifies Nuclear Weapon Free Zone", allafrica.com, 26 March 2008).

However, under Article 18 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties "A State is obliged to refrain from acts which would defeat the object and purpose of a treaty when: (a) it has signed the treaty ... until it shall have made its intention clear not to become a party to the treaty".

This would appear to imply that no signatory of the Treaty of Pelindaba is allowed to sell uranium to India until India is subject to a comprehensive safeguards agreement with the IAEA. In short, India would have to give up its nuclear weapons program if it wishes to buy uranium from Pelindaba state parties.

India: Living Beyond its Nuclear Means

posted by M. V. Ramana on Nov 1st, 2007 [15:05h]
under: India, US-India Nuclear Deal
last edited on Nov 2nd, 2007 [06:15h]

On Monday, 21 October, S. K. Jain, the head of the Nuclear Power Corporation of India Limited announced that uranium fuel shortages had led to five of India’s 17 nuclear power plants being shut down and the rest were now, on average, at half power.

This crisis is no surprise. India has to rely on limited, poor quality, domestic uranium to both fuel its nuclear reactors, except for two very old imported U.S. reactors for which it is occasionally able to import fuel, and to produce material for its nuclear weapons program, and there is not enough to go around. Over the last few years, fuel shortages have forced the capacity factors of Indian nuclear power plants to fall from an average of about 75% in 2003-04 to 56% in 2006-07. The Department of Atomic Energy has been trying to open up many new mines around the country, but has been meeting stiff local opposition on environmental, public health, and social grounds.

The roots of the problem are long-standing international efforts to stem proliferation through the adoption of export control norms, Indian determination to pursue its nuclear weapons program, and poor planning by the managers of the Indian atomic complex.

From the perspective of the Indian nuclear establishment, one of the important motivations for the US-India nuclear deal is to relieve the uranium crunch. By exempting India from international nuclear trade rules, the deal would let India import uranium. Importing uranium will allow India to fuel its safeguarded power reactors, build more reactors, and free up India’s domestic uranium for its military program. (See Fissile Materials in South Asia: The Implications of the U.S.-India Nuclear Deal).

But the deal has taken longer than expected. It has stalled as India’s Communist Parties, who are part of the ruling coalition, worry about Washington using the deal to force Indian policy to come into line with US interests.

Read More Below:

India used a nuclear reactor, technology and material it bought for peaceful purposes to make plutonium for its nuclear weapons program, including for its 1974 nuclear weapons test. In response, and to stop others from doing the same, the international community banned nuclear sales to countries that are outside the NPT and do not allow IAEA inspectors access to all their facilities. These rules now apply only to India, Pakistan and Israel.

As of October 2007, the total electric capacity of India’s domestically fuelled power reactors is 3800 MWe. At 80% capacity, these reactors would require about 545 tons of natural uranium fuel per year. The weapon plutonium production reactors need about another 35 tons of uranium annually. The uranium enrichment facility may need about 10 tons of natural uranium feed a year to make fuel for India’s nuclear submarine. The total current requirements are almost 600 tons of domestic natural uranium per year.

Indian uranium mining has not kept pace with increases in the number of nuclear reactors. The relatively better quality ore has already been mined, leaving only very low grade ore of the kind not mined in any other country.

India’s older uranium mines in the Jaduguda area, in eastern India, produce about 200 tons/year. An open cast mine was recently inaugurated in nearby Bandurang and is yet to reach full capacity. But it will only produce about 280 tons of natural uranium. Two smaller mines are scheduled for 2008 and 2010, but may be delayed.

The US-India nuclear deal is an effort to change all this (see Wrong Ends, Means, and Needs: Behind the U.S. Nuclear Deal With India). In July 2005, President Bush and Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh announced agreement on a deal to exempt India from the US and international rules that for almost three decades have sought to prevent it and other states from using commercial imports of nuclear technology and fuel to aid their nuclear weapons ambitions. The policy shift comes because Washington seeks a new strategic ally in India to counter a rising China, and Wall Street wants better access to Indian markets. Leaders in New Delhi desire great power status and acceptance as a nuclear weapon state and a larger nuclear power sector.

Back to all posts