http://www.fissilematerials.org/ipfm/pages_us_en/blog/blog/blog.php The IPFM BLOG: Tracking highly enriched uranium and plutonium, the key ingredients in nuclear weapons, and fostering global efforts to secure and eliminate these materials This blog by members of the International Panel on Fissile Materials (IPFM), including co-chair Frank von Hippel of Princeton University, aims to provide the public, the media and policy makers information, technical analysis, and ideas to further nuclear disarmament, halt the proliferation of nuclear weapons, and ensure that terrorists do not acquire nuclear weapons. The views expressed in this blog are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent positions of the IPFM. en-us Tue, 08 Jul 2008 16:08:55 EDT Tue, 08 Jul 2008 16:08:55 EDT http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/tech/rss contact@fissilematerials.org contact@fissilematerials.org http://www.fissilematerials.org/ipfm/pages_us_en/blog/blog/blog.php
When current reprocessing contracts are fulfilled, Sellafield operations will have resulted in an accumulated UK stock of about 100 tonnes of separated plutonium – enough to make more than 10,000 nuclear weapons – plus almost 2 million cubic meters of radioactive waste. The plutonium is considered to be an asset of "zero value." The estimated direct cost of cleanup at the Sellafield site has risen to 73 billion British pounds ($146 billion). The final reckoning will be known only a half century hence when the cleanup is to be completed. Since the government-owned operator of the site, British Nuclear Fuels Limited, was found to be technically bankrupt, responsibility for operations there have been taken over by a government-established Nuclear Decommissioning Authority.


Magnox Fuel Storage Pond (Source: BNFL)

The report, commissioned by IPFM and authored by Martin Forwood, the Director of the UK non-governmental group CORE, concludes that this legacy is a result of UK reprocessing policy being driven by the short-term interests of the industry and by hopes that this industry could earn the UK foreign exchange through sales of reprocessing and MOX-fuel fabrication services to other countries. None of the UK’s foreign reprocessing customers have renewed their contracts, however. Most have concluded that it is much less costly to store their spent fuel at home than to send it abroad to be reprocessed and deal with the separated plutonium and returning highly radioactive waste.

Plans to either irradiate all or part of the legacy of separated plutonium in reactor fuel or dispose of it with radioactive waste currently await a decision largely dependent on whether the UK will build a new generation of nuclear power plants. A study done for the UK government found, however, that the throughput of the billion-dollar plant that was built at Sellafield for processing separated plutonium into mixed-oxide (MOX) will rise to “only a few tonnes of plutonium a year at best” because of design flaws.

The full report is available here -- For a hard copy, contact ipfm@fissilematerials.org


]]> Tue, 08 Jul 2008 15:25:18 EDT http://www.fissilematerials.org/ipfm/pages_us_en/blog/blog/blog.php here -- For a hard copy, send mailing address to ipfm@fissilematerials.org

FROM THE REPORT:

France started to reprocess spent nuclear fuel in 1958, originally to produce plutonium for weapons and later also to fuel a projected but never realized large-scale deployment of fast breeder reactors. This report looks at the reprocessing experience at France’s Marcoule and La Hague sites and assesses the record in terms of waste management, radioactive discharges, radiological and health impacts, and cost, and addresses briefly issues of safety and security.

France now has large stocks of both spent fuel (over 12,000 tons) and of separated plutonium (over 50 tons). Analysis suggests there is no clear advantage for the reprocessing option as a form of waste management, either in terms of radioactive waste volumes or repository area.



La Hague is currently the largest man-made source of radioactivity releases. The radiological impact corresponds to collective doses following a significant nuclear accident, comparable to the 1957 waste explosion in Kyshtym in Russia or the Windscale (UK) fire. Continuing discharges at this level for the expected remaining years of its operation could cause 3000 additional cancer deaths or more over the long term.

Reprocessing in France also raises safety and security concerns. For instance, an average of about two truck shipments per week of separated plutonium from La Hague travel about 1,000 km to enable production of plutonium-bearing power-reactor fuel (MOX).

The economic costs of reprocessing are high. In 2000, a report for the French Prime Minister found that choosing reprocessing instead of direct disposal of spent nuclear fuel would result in a 5.5 percent increase in average electricity generation cost or an 85 percent increase of total spent fuel and waste management costs. Industry data suggests the costs of a future reprocessing plant would need to be at most half that for La Hague in order for reprocessing to cost no more than direct disposal of spent fuel.

Until recently, foreign reprocessing contracts have offset some of La Hague’s high costs. Until around 2004, close to half of the spent-fuel processed was foreign-owned. Almost all of the foreign spent fuel under contract has been reprocessed, and only minor new contracts have been signed. The economic burden of reprocessing is increasingly weighing on the French electricity sector and may prove unsustainable if left to market forces. Earlier this year, after several years of negotiations, the state electricity utility EDF and the state nuclear fuel company AREVA NC failed to reach a long-term agreement over the utility's plutonium separation and use.

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India is desperate to increase its access to uranium because domestic sources are increasingly insufficient to support its civil and military nuclear programs. India is not able to import uranium from the Nuclear Suppliers Group of countries because it is outside the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT). The US is seeking a special exemption for India from this NSG condition of supply but progress has been slow. There is domestic opposition within India to the deal because of fears that the US may use it to influence Indian foreign policy. Others worry that access to imported uranium for its civilian power reactors would allow India to divert more domestic uranium to its nuclear weapons program.

India has also been unable so far to agree with the IAEA a set of appropriate safeguards on the parts of its nuclear program that it has declared to be civilian. The NSG has also yet to formally consider a possible exemption for India from NSG rules.

Even if the NSG grants an exemption, some NSG uranium suppliers may not export to India. Australia's new Labour Party government has announced it will not sell uranium to India unless it signs the NPT (K. Venugopal, "Australia will not supply uranium till India signs NPT," The Hindu, 2 March 2008). Thus India's turn to uranium suppliers outside the NSG.

However, India may not be able to import uranium from any of the African countries that are not in the NSG.

All the potential African uranium suppliers that have been mentioned in news reports are signatories of the 1996 African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty, the Treaty of Pelindaba. Under Article 9.C (VERIFICATION OF PEACEFUL USES) of this Treaty, each Party undertakes "Not to provide source or special fissionable material, or equipment or material especially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special fissionable material for peaceful purposes of any non-nuclear-weapon State unless subject to a comprehensive safeguards agreement concluded with IAEA."

Article II. (DEFINITIONS) refers to "source material ... as defined in Article XX of the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and as amended from time to time by the IAEA."

Article XX of the IAEA Statute says -- source material includes "uranium containing the mixture of isotopes occurring in nature"

India is not recognized as a nuclear weapon state under the NPT and therefore according to the Pelindaba Treaty must accept comprehensive or full-scope safeguards on ALL its nuclear source or special fissionable materials and associated facilities to be eligible for the purchase of uranium.

The Treaty of Pelindaba has not yet entered into force. Its entry into force requires 28 ratifications, and on March 26, 2008 Mozambique became the 24th state to ratify it. ("Mozambique: Assembly Ratifies Nuclear Weapon Free Zone", allafrica.com, 26 March 2008).

However, under Article 18 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties "A State is obliged to refrain from acts which would defeat the object and purpose of a treaty when: (a) it has signed the treaty ... until it shall have made its intention clear not to become a party to the treaty".

This would appear to imply that no signatory of the Treaty of Pelindaba is allowed to sell uranium to India until India is subject to a comprehensive safeguards agreement with the IAEA. In short, India would have to give up its nuclear weapons program if it wishes to buy uranium from Pelindaba state parties.

]]> Mon, 24 Mar 2008 11:36:25 EDT http://www.fissilematerials.org/ipfm/pages_us_en/blog/blog/blog.php announced that uranium fuel shortages had led to five of India’s 17 nuclear power plants being shut down and the rest were now, on average, at half power.



This crisis is no surprise. India has to rely on limited, poor quality, domestic uranium to both fuel its nuclear reactors, except for two very old imported U.S. reactors for which it is occasionally able to import fuel, and to produce material for its nuclear weapons program, and there is not enough to go around. Over the last few years, fuel shortages have forced the capacity factors of Indian nuclear power plants to fall from an average of about 75% in 2003-04 to 56% in 2006-07. The Department of Atomic Energy has been trying to open up many new mines around the country, but has been meeting stiff local opposition on environmental, public health, and social grounds.

The roots of the problem are long-standing international efforts to stem proliferation through the adoption of export control norms, Indian determination to pursue its nuclear weapons program, and poor planning by the managers of the Indian atomic complex.

From the perspective of the Indian nuclear establishment, one of the important motivations for the US-India nuclear deal is to relieve the uranium crunch. By exempting India from international nuclear trade rules, the deal would let India import uranium. Importing uranium will allow India to fuel its safeguarded power reactors, build more reactors, and free up India’s domestic uranium for its military program. (See Fissile Materials in South Asia: The Implications of the U.S.-India Nuclear Deal).

But the deal has taken longer than expected. It has stalled as India’s Communist Parties, who are part of the ruling coalition, worry about Washington using the deal to force Indian policy to come into line with US interests.


Read More Below:

India used a nuclear reactor, technology and material it bought for peaceful purposes to make plutonium for its nuclear weapons program, including for its 1974 nuclear weapons test. In response, and to stop others from doing the same, the international community banned nuclear sales to countries that are outside the NPT and do not allow IAEA inspectors access to all their facilities. These rules now apply only to India, Pakistan and Israel.

As of October 2007, the total electric capacity of India’s domestically fuelled power reactors is 3800 MWe. At 80% capacity, these reactors would require about 545 tons of natural uranium fuel per year. The weapon plutonium production reactors need about another 35 tons of uranium annually. The uranium enrichment facility may need about 10 tons of natural uranium feed a year to make fuel for India’s nuclear submarine. The total current requirements are almost 600 tons of domestic natural uranium per year.

Indian uranium mining has not kept pace with increases in the number of nuclear reactors. The relatively better quality ore has already been mined, leaving only very low grade ore of the kind not mined in any other country.



India’s older uranium mines in the Jaduguda area, in eastern India, produce about 200 tons/year. An open cast mine was recently inaugurated in nearby Bandurang and is yet to reach full capacity. But it will only produce about 280 tons of natural uranium. Two smaller mines are scheduled for 2008 and 2010, but may be delayed.

The US-India nuclear deal is an effort to change all this (see Wrong Ends, Means, and Needs: Behind the U.S. Nuclear Deal With India). In July 2005, President Bush and Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh announced agreement on a deal to exempt India from the US and international rules that for almost three decades have sought to prevent it and other states from using commercial imports of nuclear technology and fuel to aid their nuclear weapons ambitions. The policy shift comes because Washington seeks a new strategic ally in India to counter a rising China, and Wall Street wants better access to Indian markets. Leaders in New Delhi desire great power status and acceptance as a nuclear weapon state and a larger nuclear power sector.


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This coming Thursday, Frank von Hippel, Harold Feiveson, and Alexander Glaser will present findings from the Global Fissile Material Report 2007 at the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, Princeton University. Everyone is invited.

WHEN: Thursday, October 25, 12:30-2:00 p.m.
WHERE: Robertson Hall, Bowl 001 (NEW LOCATION), Princeton University

This is a follow-up to our briefing last week at the U.N. The slides of Glaser's presentation, which focused on nuclear weapons and fissile material stockpiles and reductions, are available here.]]> Mon, 22 Oct 2007 14:49:34 EDT http://www.fissilematerials.org/ipfm/pages_us_en/blog/blog/blog.php announced that the U.S. will remove 9 metric tons of plutonium from its weapon stockpile. This most recent declaration is a 20 percent reduction of the amount of plutonium in the U.S. stockpile of plutonium assigned to the weapon program: the remaining inventory of weapon-grade plutonium is now 37.8 tons (see updated bar chart below).


Click here to enlarge


Assuming a fissile material inventory of 4 kg in an average pit, the 9 tons would be equivalent to more than 2,000 nuclear warheads and the 36 tons remaining in U.S. pits that has not been declared excess would be equivalent to almost 10,000 warheads.

In 1995, the U.S. declared 45 tons of separated plutonium excess. Of that, 38.2 tons was weapon grade, of which 21.3 tons was actually in excess weapons or components at Pantex. This left 44.9 tons of weapon-grade plutonium in weapons and components at Pantex plus 1.9 tons of weapon-grade plutonium in other locations not declared excess. All this data is summarized in the DOE's 1996 publication Plutonium: The First 50 Years.

For a recent discussion of plutonium disposition efforts, see Chapter 3 of the Global Fissile Material Report 2007, Disposition of Excess Plutonium, lead-authored by Matthew Bunn (Managing the Atom, Harvard University).

]]> Mon, 22 Oct 2007 10:28:43 EDT http://www.fissilematerials.org/ipfm/pages_us_en/blog/blog/blog.php Harold Feiveson, Alexander Glaser and Frank von Hippel from the International Panel on Fissile Materials (IPFM) will speak at the United Nations on: "Toward a Global Cleanout of Nuclear Weapon Materials."

This event will be sponsored by the U.N. NGO Committee on Disarmament, Peace and Security, with the cooperation of the U.N. Office for Disarmament Affairs.

WHEN: Friday, October 19, 1:15-2:45 p.m.

WHERE: Conference Room 8, United Nations Headquarters, NYC

The Global Fissile Material Report 2007 appears on the fiftieth aniversary of a remarkable moment of arms-control history. In November 1957, the U.N. General Assembly Resolution 1148 (XII) called for an agreement to provide for "[...] the cessation of the production of fissionable materials for weapons purposes and the complete devotion of future production of fissionable materials to non-weapons purposes under effective international control; [...]" -- now better known as a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty. Here is the full text of the resolution (also as PDF).]]> Tue, 16 Oct 2007 11:19:29 EDT http://www.fissilematerials.org/ipfm/pages_us_en/blog/blog/blog.php On Thursday, 11 October, the International Institute for Strategic Studies, London, will host the launch of the 2007 Global Fissile Material Report by the International Panel on Fissile Materials (IPFM), an independent group of scientists and analysts from sixteen countries.

The Global Fissile Material Report provides an annual review of worldwide stocks, production, and disposition of highly enriched uranium (HEU) and plutonium, the key ingredients in nuclear weapons, and assesses global efforts to secure and eliminate these materials. Deep cuts and consolidation in the stocks of highly enriched uranium and plutonium is critical to nuclear disarmament, halting the proliferation of nuclear weapons, and ensuring that terrorists do not acquire nuclear weapons.

Download the full report: GFMR 2007

Here's the Table of Contents:

1. Nuclear Weapon and Fissile Material Stockpiles and Production
2. Disposition of Excess Highly Enriched Uranium
3. Disposition of Excess Plutonium
4. Fissile Material Consolidation in the U.S. Nuclear Complex
5. Progress Toward Nuclear Disarmament
6. International Safeguards in the Nuclear Weapon States
7. Managing the Civilian Nuclear Fuel Cycle
8. Russia’s Nuclear-Energy Complex and its Roles as an International Fuel-Cycle-Services Provider
9. Detection of Clandestine Fissile Material Production

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